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Abstract 
Harm-centric accounts of judgments of moral wrongdoing argue that moral judgments are 
fundamentally based on appraisals of harm. However, past research has failed to 
operationally discriminate harm appraisals from appraisals related to injustice. Four studies 
carefully discriminated harm qua pain/suffering from injustice, alongside appraisals related to 
impurity, authority, and disloyalty. Appraisals of injustice outperformed appraisals of harm 
as independent predictors of the judged wrongness of recalled offenses (Study 1). Studies 2a, 
2b and 3 extended these findings using a diverse range of wrongful acts and two different 
cultural samples—the United States and Greece. In addition to the strong relevance of 
injustice appraisals, these latter studies uncovered substantial contributions of impurity and 
authority appraisals. The results inform debates on moral pluralism and the foundations of 
moral cognition.    
Keywords: moral judgment, harm, injustice, moral foundations theory, moral pluralism       
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Which appraisals are foundational to moral judgment? 
Harm, injustice, and beyond   
Introduction 
 Perceptions of harm are important for moral judgments. But is perceived pain or 
suffering the fundamental input driving our judgments of moral wrongdoing? “Harm-centric” 
approaches to moral cognition posit that when people judge any act to be morally wrong, it is 
because they perceive the act to cause harm. On this view, harm constitutes a foundational, 
organizing template by which all immoral actions are conceptualised (Gray & Schein, 2012; 
Gray, Schein, & Ward, 2014; Gray, Waytz, & Young, 2012; Schein & Gray, 2015, 2018).  
By contrast, some have defended a deflationary view of harm, claiming that perceptions of 
harm cannot be sufficient for judgments of wrongdoing because people often find harmful 
acts acceptable (Fiske & Rai, 2014; Piazza & Sousa, 2016; Piazza, Sousa, & Holbrook, 2013; 
Sousa & Piazza, 2014; Sousa, Holbrook, & Piazza, 2009). When malevolent criminals are 
jailed, when a country attacks another country in self-defence, and when scientists subject 
animals to painful medical tests to test a vaccine, individuals are made to suffer. Yet, for 
many of us, these represent instances of acceptable harmful acts. Thus, appraisals beyond the 
causation of pain/suffering must be shaping our judgments of wrongdoing. This argument 
obtains even with a somewhat broader definition of harm as welfare reduction, which is not 
necessarily tied to pain/suffering as a psychological state, or with a more restricted definition 
of harm as the intentional causation of pain/suffering.  
One increasingly popular harm-centric perspective is that of Gray and colleagues. 
This group of researchers sometimes characterize harm simply in terms of the causation of 
pain/suffering (e.g., “judgments of harm require seeing a mind capable of suffering”; Schein 
& Gray, 2015, p. 3), yet other times they define harm more specifically as the intentional 
causation of pain/suffering: “harm involves the perception of two interacting minds, one 
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mind (an agent) intentionally causing suffering to another mind (a patient)” (Schein & Gray, 
2015, p. 3). However, intentionality is not sufficient to elevate the causation of pain/suffering 
to the level of wrongdoing, as the example of punishment makes clear: people often think of 
punishment as deserved and therefore not wrongdoing.  
The deflationary perspective on harm posits that if a harmful act is appraised as 
involving injustice, then it is judged to be morally wrong (for a detailed discussion, see Sousa 
& Piazza, 2014; also Baumard, 2016). On this view, the appraisal that a harmful act involves 
injustice is the appraisal that the actor did not consider the balance of interests involved when 
causing pain/suffering. Such an appraisal prototypically entails a belief that the actor acted 
from selfish motives: the actor either prioritised his/her own interests over that of others (e.g., 
when one steals from another person), or he/she preferentially prioritised the interests of 
another when fair treatment is expected (e.g., when a father gives preferential treatment to 
one of his children over another simply because he likes one more). Thus, on this view, 
appraisals of injustice are generally linked to appraisals of selfishness.  
Although deflationary theories claim that harm perception is insufficient for moral 
judgments of wrongdoing, they are neutral on whether perceptions of harm and/or injustice 
are necessary for such judgments. By contrast, pluralistic approaches to moral judgment, such 
as Shweder, Much, Mahapatra, and Park’s (1997) “big three” ethical codes and Graham et 
al.’s (2013) Moral Foundations Theory (MFT), argue that harm and injustice are not the only 
inputs to our judgments of wrongdoing. For example, Haidt (2007, 2012) has claimed that 
socially “binding” concerns related to respect for authority, loyalty to one’s ingroup (family, 
country, etc.), and the purity or sanctity of the body, constitute distinct foundational sources 
of moral judgment.  
Here, we report studies that shed new light on these debates concerning which 
appraisals are foundational to moral judgments of wrongdoing by addressing some 
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methodological issues and limitations with previous research. First, we attempted to improve 
upon past operational definitions of harm. Schein and Gray (2015), for example, reported 
seven studies purportedly showing the foundational role of harm in moral judgment by using 
terms like “harm,” “harmful,” or related synonyms (e.g., “cruel”) to operationalize the 
relevant concept of harm. However, these ordinary terms for harm are polysemous and often 
imply wrongdoing or even injustice. Indeed, this conflation of harm and wrongdoing can be 
observed in Schein and Gray’s Study 1, which scored prototypically unjust acts, such as 
murder, stealing, and adultery, as forms of “harm.” It remains unclear whether their results 
show that the relevant notion of harm, related to the causation of pain/suffering, is playing the 
key role in participants’ judgments. Second, although deflationary theorists have made 
detailed theoretical arguments for their position (e.g., Sousa & Piazza, 2014), the evidence 
they have provided is mostly based on the reanalysis of other researchers’ data (see, e.g., 
Piazza & Sousa, 2016). Moreover, they have not directly probed the role of injustice, which 
includes the perception of selfishness, in judgments of wrongdoing, nor have they 
systematically assessed its role across a diversity of transgressions beyond harmful 
transgressions.  
Finally, although research by Graham et al. (2009) have arguably shown that many 
people do find concerns relating to impurity, disloyalty, and disrespect for authority to be 
relevant to their moral considerations, the validity of pluralistic approaches rests on 
demonstrating that each appraisal dimension contributes uniquely to judgments of 
wrongdoing, and that each dimension is not perceived to be reducible to any other; for 
example, that the notion of impurity is not reducible to harm, as some have argued (Gray & 
Keeney, 2015). The present research design uniquely allowed us to measure the relevance of 
multiple appraisals for moral judgments across a wide range of moral transgressions that are 
representative of different moral foundations. We were therefore able to investigate the extent 
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to which particular appraisals are consistently relevant for moral judgments across a diverse 
range of content, versus having a restricted relevance.  This approach provided a novel way 
of addressing prominent debates on moral monism and pluralism. 
Overview of Studies and Hypotheses 
We hypothesized that when care is taken to tease apart appraisals of causing 
pain/suffering and appraisals of injustice, the latter would provide a more extensive 
foundation for moral judgments. We also hypothesized, based on pluralistic theories, that 
other appraisal dimensions beyond harm and injustice (e.g., impurity) would make 
independent contributions to judgments of wrongdoing. In Study 1, American participants 
recalled an autobiographical experience of wrongdoing, rated its wrongfulness, and made ten 
appraisals of the action. To allow an even broader test of moral pluralism, in the remaining 
studies, American (Studies 2a–2b) and Greek participants (Study 3) were presented ten 
transgressions related to Graham et al.’s (2013) five moral foundations. As in Study 1, 
participants judged their wrongness and appraised them. All collected measures and 
conditions are reported. Full materials (.qsf files) and anonymised data sets for Studies 1–3 
are available at https://osf.io/g7dpn/. 
Study 1 
In Study 1, we employed a recall paradigm that drew upon naturalistic perceptions of 
wrongdoing. The methodology was a revised version of that employed by Schein and Gray 
(2015, Study 1). Participants were asked to report a real instance of wrongdoing from their 
lives and rate its wrongness, rather than abstractly “list an act that is morally wrong”. Finally, 
for each reported act, participants were asked whether a series of ten appraisals would apply 
to the act and the applicability of each was measured on Likert scales (Schein and Gray’s 
participants had to chose one of five appraisals: “harmful, unfair, disloyal, disobedient, and 
gross”). Appraisals of harm were measured in terms of causing pain/suffering and welfare 
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reduction (“The action caused someone pain”; “The action negatively affected the wellbeing 
of someone”), separate from injustice (“The action was unjust”; “unfair”;  “selfish”). We also 
included appraisals of impurity, disrespect for authority, and group disloyalty, to connect to 
MFT (Graham et al., 2013). Finally, we included one appraisal, “dishonest” (also related to 
injustice), that is important in the literature on moral character (e.g., Brambilla & Leach, 
2014; Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014).  
Method  
 Participants. We aimed to collect 160 adult participants on Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, restricting participation to those located in the United States and those who passed a 
Captcha question; 160 falls within the sample size range required to determine whether a 
correlation coefficient at r = .20-.25 differs from zero with Type I error rate  (two-tailed) = 
.05 and Type II error rate  = .20 (Hulley, Cummings, Browner, Grady, & Newman, 2013). 
One hundred and sixty-one workers completed the study and were paid $0.50; five failed to 
provide any transgression or wrote nonsense (e.g., “gf”). One person failed to answer the 
wrongness probe. These participants were removed leaving N = 155 (85 male, 70 female; 
Mage = 35.74 years, SD = 11.65; 85% White/Caucasian, 7% Asian, 6% Black/African 
American, 2% Hispanic/Latino). 
 Materials and procedures. After providing consent, participants were instructed: 
“We would like you to think about an action that you recently witnessed or heard about 
where someone did something wrong. This could be a minor offence or something major.” 
They were given a large text box to describe the action. They were prompted to spend some 
time writing, and, to structure their response, were asked: “What was the person’s 
relationship to you? What did they do? What was wrong about it?” The mean writing time 
was 2 minutes and 18 seconds (SD = 209.83). Next, on a separate page, participants rated the 
wrongness of the action on a 1-7 scale (1 = Not at all wrong to 7 = Extremely wrong). Then 
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they appraised the action on ten dimensions, “to what extent do the following descriptions 
apply to the action you wrote about?” (1 = Not at all to 7 = Extremely). The ten dimensions 
were: “The action…was unjust, selfish, unfair, dishonest, impure, made me feel nauseous 
(grossed out), was disrespectful toward an authority, involved someone being disloyal to their 
group, negatively affected the wellbeing of someone, caused someone pain.” Finally, in all 
studies, participants answered basic demographic questions, were debriefed, and paid.  
Data reduction and analysis plan. We adopted a conceptual-empirical data 
reduction strategy that aggregated the items unjust, selfish, unfair and dishonest (Cronbach’s 
 = .85) into a single injustice index, aggregated the items pain and negatively affected 
wellbeing ( = .80) into a harm index, and aggregated the items impure and nauseous 
(grossed out) ( = .68) into an impurity index. The single items related to authority 
(disrespectful) and group loyalty (disloyalty) were each treated separately. The same 
appraisal indices were used in all four studies (see Supplementary Materials for index 
reliabilities and exploratory factor analysis results).  
In all four studies, we ran a linear regression on wrongness judgments using the 
appraisal indices (harm, injustice, impurity, disrespectful, disloyalty) as simultaneous 
predictors. In Studies 2a-3, as a secondary analytical strategy, we also conducted a mixed 
linear analysis of the five-factor model for each study, to control for variability in the 
repeated judgments of participants across ten scenarios and to take all five appraisals into 
account in a single analysis. See Supplementary Materials for additional analyses, and 
discussion, with the item “unjust” removed from the injustice index (as per the request of a 
reviewer).  
Results and Discussion 
 Reported wrongdoing. We first coded participants’ qualitative responses (N = 155) 
to understand the diversity of moral content, and to determine whether some responses were 
APPRAISALS FOUNDATIONAL TO MORAL JUDGMENT 8
unscorable.  The first author coded the responses, and the fourth author coded them 
independently using the categories developed by the first author (Cohen’s  = .725). This 
two-rater procedure led to two original categories being dropped or merged with the others. 
Transgression categories are presented in Figure S1 in Supplementary Materials. There was 
quite a diversity of transgressions reported (14 categories total); for 12% of responses the 
nature of the transgression was unclear or unscorable.  
 Appraisal ratings. The mean scores, and standard errors, for our five appraisal 
dimensions can be seen in Figure S2 in Supplementary Materials. Note that while mean 
appraisal ratings offer some insight into the perceived relevance of each appraisal within a 
scenario, these ratings cannot answer the question of which appraisals contributed to variance 
in the wrongness ratings.   
Main analysis. Details regarding the distribution properties (skew, kurtosis) of the 
wrongness ratings and each predictor within the regression model can be found in 
Supplementary Materials (see Table S5 for distribution properties for all studies). Of the 138 
scorable offenses, the mean wrongness rating was 5.81 (SD = 1.28). The five-factor model 
explained a significant amount of variance in participants’ wrongness ratings, R2 = .59, 
F(5,133) = 38.46, p < .001. Injustice appraisals contributed the most predictive value,  = 
.48, t(133) = 6.43, p < .001, 95% CI [.303, .573] followed by harm appraisals,  = .29, t(133) 
= 4.08, p < .001, 95% CI [.098, .282]. None of the other appraisals contributed significantly 
to wrongness judgments, s < .13, ps > .11 (95% CIs contained 0). Thus, when we 
operationalized the concept of harm carefully (with terms related to pain/suffering and 
reduced welfare), we found that injustice provided a much stronger foundation for 
immorality. This was shown using a transgression recall paradigm that produced a large 
diversity of moral content (see Figure S1).   
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In Study 1, we found little evidence for moral pluralism. However, certain immoral 
acts related to impurity, disrespect for authority, and group disloyalty (e.g., incest, betraying 
one’s country) may be uncommon, and thus may rarely appear in people’s recollections of 
wrongdoing as prompted in Study 1. Thus, to deliberately cover the five foundations of 
morality articulated within MFT, Studies 2a and 2b presented participants with scenarios 
designed to evaluate wrongness judgments across five moral foundations, as theorized by 
Graham et al. (2013), thus, providing a wider test of moral pluralism.    
Studies 2a–2b 
Studies 2a and 2b differed mainly in one aspect: Study 2a asked how “wrong” was 
each action, while Study 2b asked how “morally wrong” was each action. Study 2b used 
“morally” to address measurement commensurability with Schein and Gray (2015; see e.g., 
Study 1), while Study 2a is consistent with the MFT approach, which avoids using the term 
“morally” in assessing judgments of wrongdoing within the Moral Foundations 
Questionnaire (see Graham et al., 2009, Study 1).  
Method 
 Participants. We recruited two new samples of MTurk workers based in the United 
States, and analysed data from all individuals who completed the study and passed the 
Captcha question. Participants were paid $1.00. We aimed to recruit a minimum of 200 
participants in each study. In Study 2a, 231 individuals started the survey, and 206 completed 
it (124 male, 82 female; Mage = 34.87 years, SD = 11.20; 78% White, 11% Asian, 7% Black, 
4% Hispanic or other). In Study 2b, 272 individual started the survey, and 251 completed it 
(141 male, 110 female; Mage = 35.52 years, SD = 12.28; 76% White, 10% Black, 7% Asian, 
7% Hispanic or other). Study 2a ran 16–22 April, 2016; Study 2b ran 9–18 June, 2018. 
 Materials and procedures. The procedure was nearly identical for both studies. 
Participants provided informed consent and then completed ten transgression blocks (two 
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actions for each foundation) presented in a randomized order. Each scenario described a 
unique, female actor who engaged in a transgressive action (see Table 1). The scenarios were 
derived from Graham et al. (2009) but were modified to clarify the motive of the actor. This 
allowed transgressive aspects of the actions to be made explicit, and discouraged participants 
from thinking that the actors may have had good reasons for engaging in the acts (e.g., in the 
dog scenario, inferences of self-defense were pre-empted by specifying that the kicking was 
motivated by dislike). For each scenario block in Study 2a, participants judged whether it was 
wrong or NOT wrong for the actor to have engaged in the act. If they selected “wrong”, they 
were then asked to rate how wrong (1 = Not wrong at all to 7 = Extremely wrong). The “NOT 
wrong” responses were scored (1). In Study 2b, the first step of this process was eliminated 
and participants simply rated how “morally wrong” was the action using the same 1–7 scale. 
Participants then rated the act on the ten appraisal dimensions from Study 1, on the same 1–7 
scale.  
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Table 1. Transgression scenarios used in Studies 2a, 2b and 3. 
Category Scenario 
Harm (H1) Abby kicks a dog in the head, hard, because she doesn’t like it. 
(H2) Cindy makes cruel remarks to an overweight person about their 
appearance because she doesn’t like them. 
Unfairness (F1) Robin only hires people of her race in her company because she 
prefers working with people of her own race. 
(F2) Even though Maria has some free time, Maria does not help her 
friend move into a new apartment after her friend had helped her 
move the month before. 
Group Disloyalty (L1) Nicola breaks off all communication with her immediate and 
extended family for one year simply because she had a heated 
argument with them.  
(L2) Fiona burns her country’s flag in private (nobody else sees her) 
because she doesn’t like her country. 
Authority (A1) Clare curses her parents to their face simply because she is 
angry with them.  
(A2) Jen makes a disrespectful hand gesture to her boss in a group 
meeting because she doesn’t like her boss. 
Impurity/Degradation (P1) Lisa cooks and eats her dog after it dies of natural causes 
because she wanted to see what it tastes like.  
(P2) Julia has consensual sex with her biological brother who she 
has known all her life. They are both adults, desire each other, 
performed the act in private, and used contraceptives. 
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Results and Discussion 
 Wrongness and appraisal ratings. Figure 1 depicts the wrongness ratings for the ten 
transgression scenarios for Studies 2a–2b. There was a great deal of variation across the 
scenarios in the mean levels of judged wrongdoing (Study 2a: range = 2.50 [L1] to 6.47 [H1]; 
Study 2b: range = 3.81 [L1] to 6.65 [H1]). Though the means were slightly higher in Study 
2b, perhaps due to the elimination of the initial binary probe, the pattern of means was 
consistent across studies. Mean ratings, and standard errors, of the five appraisal indices as a 
function of scenario can be found in Figures S3–S4 in Supplementary Materials.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Mean wrongness ratings and standard errors (±1 S.E.) for the ten transgression 
scenarios used in Studies 2a–2b (American sample) and Study 3 (Greek sample).   
 
 Main analysis. Tables 2–3 show the results of the full regression model for the ten 
scenarios, along with collinearity statistics (multicollinearity was not an issue except in one 
instance, flag burning, for both studies, predominantly for the injustice and impurity indices). 
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In Study 2a, the injustice index was a significant predictor of wrongdoing for nine out of ten 
scenarios ( range = .15-.64), consensual incest being the exception. By contrast, the harm 
index was a significant predictor for only the two harm scenarios and one of the fairness 
scenarios (friend). The results for Study 2b were quite similar. The injustice index 
significantly predicted wrongdoing in all scenarios ( range = .29-.65). The harm index 
significantly predicted wrongdoing in seven out of ten scenarios, though it was a negative 
predictor in one of those seven (flag burning), and, with the exception of the harm scenarios, 
it was a weaker predictor than injustice. These findings show that injustice appraisals were 
foundational across moral diversity, whereas harm appraisals were much less foundational, 
though not insubstantial.  
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Table 2. Appraisals predicting judgments of wrongdoing from Study 2a (American sample without using “morally”).  
 
 
Scenario 
 
Appraisals 
Model    
R2 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF  t 95% CI 
Harm 1 – Dog 
kicking 
    .60   
 Injustice index .15 2.13* [.009, .230]  .43 2.32 
 Harm index .55 10.56*** [.625, .913]  .75 1.34 
 Impurity index .27 4.34*** [.085, .226]  .54 1.86 
 Disrespectful to 
authority -.07 -0.99 
[-.088, .029]  .47 2.14 
 Disloyal to group -.04 -0.51 [-.079, .046]  .40 2.51 
Harm 2 – Overweight      .50   
 Injustice index .33 3.80*** [.184, .581]  .34 2.92 
 Harm index .41 6.37*** [.372, .706]  .61 1.64 
 Impurity index .16 2.29* [.021, .278]  .49 2.03 
 Disrespectful to 
authority -.17 -2.34* 
[-.269, -.023]  .51 1.97 
 Disloyal to group .01 0.17 [-.114, .136]  .46 2.19 
Fairness 1 – Race      .59   
 Injustice index .64 9.32*** [.739, 1.135]  .44 2.29 
 Harm index .13 1.86 [-.010, .347]  .44 2.25 
 Impurity index .06 0.97 [-.064, .189]  .52 1.91 
 Disrespectful to 
authority -.04 -0.67 
[-.156, .077]  .57 1.76 
 Disloyal to group .04 0.64 [-.072, .140]  .61 1.64 
Fairness 2 – Friend      .47   
 Injustice index .43 5.71*** [.364, .747]  .46 2.16 
 Harm index .17 2.42* [.034, .341]  .52 1.94 
 Impurity index .21 2.67** [.068, .451]  .42 2.38 
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 Disrespectful to 
authority -.10 -1.50 
[-.303, .041]  .53 1.89 
 Disloyal to group .05 0.75 [-.080, .179]  .57 1.76 
Loyalty 1 – Family     .43   
 Injustice index .37 3.77** [.223, .751]  .31 3.28 
 Harm index .09 1.22 [-.075, .318]  .51 1.94 
 Impurity index .13 1.87 [-.011, .398]  .57 1.75 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .02 0.32 
[-.122, .169]  .60 1.65 
 Disloyal to group .17 2.09* [.011, .346]  .45 2.22 
Loyalty 2 – Flag 
burning 
    .60   
 Injustice index .36 3.40** [.180, .679]  .18 5.53 
 Harm index -.09 -1.25 [-.305, .069]  .37 2.71 
 Impurity index .38 4.12*** [.246, .696]  .24 4.24 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .00 0.00 
[-.131, .131]  .45 2.24 
 Disloyal to group .20 2.82** [.061, .342]  .39 2.53 
Authority 1 – Parents      .44   
 Injustice index .32 3.52** [.177, .627]  .34 2.91 
 Harm index .12 1.72 [-.024, .357]  .57 1.75 
 Impurity index .18 2.26* [.027, .398]  .47 2.13 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .25 4.37*** 
[.197, .521]  .84 1.19 
 Disloyal to group .01 0.15 [-.147, .171]  .47 2.15 
Authority 2 – Boss      .40   
 Injustice index .32 3.34** [.149, .580]  .33 3.04 
 Harm index .12 1.59 [-.029, .275]  .56 1.77 
 Impurity index .11 1.37 [-.056, .307]  .48 2.10 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .18 3.15** 
[.100, .435]  .90 1.11 
 Disloyal to group .12 1.51 [-.034, .261]  .51 1.96 
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Purity 1 – Dog eating      .62   
 Injustice index .34 4.32*** [.243, .652]  .30 3.35 
 Harm index -.11 -1.96 [-.375, .001]  .58 1.73 
 Impurity index .58 10.55*** [.665, .971]  .62 1.62 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .01 0.18 
[-.180, .216]  .32 3.11 
 Disloyal to group -.02 -0.27 [-.221, .167]  .29 3.45 
Purity 2 – 
Consensual incest  
    .58   
 Injustice index .06 0.62 [-.157, .300]  .26 3.78 
 Harm index .07 0.89 [-.098, .258]  .33 3.03 
 Impurity index .66 11.43*** [.719, 1.019]  .64 1.55 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .04 0.57 
[-.109, .197]  .46 2.20 
 Disloyal to group .02 0.30 [-.121, .165]  .46 2.17 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Betas in bold are significant at p < .05. R2 given for full model. Ns = 202-206. 
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Table 3. Appraisals predicting judgments of wrongdoing from Study 2b (American sample using “morally”). 
 
 
Scenario 
 
Appraisals 
Model    
R2 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF  t 95% CI 
Harm 1 – Dog 
kicking 
    .56   
 Injustice index .41 5.79*** [.267, .542]  .36 2.74 
 Harm index .43 7.93*** [.414, .687]  .62 1.61 
 Impurity index .07 1.16 [-.040, .156]  .44 2.25 
 Disrespectful to 
authority -.07 -1.12 
[-.100, .027]  .47 2.12 
 Disloyal to group -.01 -0.19 [-.080, .066]  .38 2.60 
Harm 2 – Overweight      .56   
 Injustice index .43 5.93*** [.266, .532]  .35 2.89 
 Harm index .42 7.83*** [.321, .537]  .63 1.59 
 Impurity index .11 1.63 [-.017, .178]  .37 2.70 
 Disrespectful to 
authority -.04 -0.68 
[-.101, .049]  .52 1.92 
 Disloyal to group -.12 -1.74 [-.171, .010]  .36 2.82 
Fairness 1 – Race      .56   
 Injustice index .47 6.90*** [.394, .708]  .40 2.53 
 Harm index .26 4.08*** [.140, .403]  .46 2.17 
 Impurity index .09 1.45 [-.026, .173]  .49 2.06 
 Disrespectful to 
authority -.01 -0.19 
[-.085, .070]  .58 1.74 
 Disloyal to group .08 1.48 [-.019, .132]  .60 1.67 
Fairness 2 – Friend      .61   
 Injustice index .39 5.93*** [.304, .606]  .37 2.69 
 Harm index .19 2.83** [.057, .320]  .36 2.75 
 Impurity index .30 4.09*** [.135, .387]  .31 3.23 
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 Disrespectful to 
authority .02 0.24 
[-.088, .112]  .43 2.30 
 Disloyal to group .01 0.15 [-.092, .108]  .55 1.82 
Loyalty 1 – Family     .69   
 Injustice index .48 6.34*** [.358, .681]  .23 4.39 
 Harm index .11 2.19* [.013, .247]  .49 2.04 
 Impurity index .31 4.95*** [.171, .397]  .34 2.94 
 Disrespectful to 
authority -.06 -1.27 
[-.138, .030]  .55 1.81 
 Disloyal to group .08 1.54 [-.022, .181]  .49 2.03 
Loyalty 2 – Flag 
burning 
    .79   
 Injustice index .65 8.49*** [.561, .900]  .15 6.75 
 Harm index -.18 -2.89** [-.313, -.059]  .22 4.56 
 Impurity index .37 5.27*** [.252, .553]  .18 5.61 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .01 0.14 
[-.081, .094]  .50 1.99 
 Disloyal to group .08 2.01* [.002, .170]  .51 1.95 
Authority 1 – Parents      .53   
 Injustice index .33 3.89*** [.162, .494]  .27 3.66 
 Harm index .12 1.88 [-.006, .261]  .46 2.17 
 Impurity index .28 3.81*** [.119, .374]  .36 2.81 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .15 2.82** 
[.046, .260]  .67 1.49 
 Disloyal to group -.02 -0.32 [-.126, .091]  .45 2.25 
Authority 2 – Boss      .57   
 Injustice index .54 6.70*** [.392, .721]  .27 3.69 
 Harm index .17 2.72** [.045, .281]  .46 2.18 
 Impurity index -.05 -0.71 [-.176, .083]  .34 2.96 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .08 1.72 
[-.013, .196]  .73 1.36 
 Disloyal to group .14 2.43* [.025, .234]  .54 1.85 
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Purity 1 – Dog eating      .64   
 Injustice index .45 5.75*** [.285, .581]  .25 4.08 
 Harm index .03 0.38 [-.097, .144]  .34 2.95 
 Impurity index .49 9.37*** [.462, .707]  .55 1.83 
 Disrespectful to 
authority -.13 -2.08* 
[-.234, -.007]  .36 2.80 
 Disloyal to group .00 0.05 [-.111, .118]  .32 3.08 
Purity 2 – 
Consensual incest  
    .64   
 Injustice index .29 3.48** [.122, .441]  .21 4.83 
 Harm index -.01 -0.10 [-.131, .118]  .29 3.39 
 Impurity index .59 11.88*** [.530, .741]  .60 1.67 
 Disrespectful to 
authority -.09 -1.67 
[-.160, .013]  .55 1.81 
 Disloyal to group .05 0.88 [-.056, .147]  .39 2.59 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Betas in bold are significant at p < .05. R2 given for full model. Ns = 249–251. 
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 Consistent with moral pluralism, we observed domain-specific contributions from 
domain-relevant appraisals for nearly every moral foundation. In Study 2a, appraisals of 
group disloyalty contributed significantly to moral judgments of group disloyalty for both 
disloyalty scenarios (one in Study 2b), and appraisals of disrespect for authority contributed 
selectively to judgments of the authority scenarios (one in Study 2b). Appraisals of impurity 
were significant predictors for both purity scenarios, but also had a wider contribution to 
other domains of action, including both harm scenarios, one of the fairness scenarios (friend), 
one of the disloyalty scenarios (flag burning), and one of the authority scenarios (parents); in 
Study 2b, impurity appraisals predicted wrongdoing judgments for six scenarios, including 
both purity scenarios.  
 Mixed linear model. To determine which of the appraisals impacted participants’ 
wrongness judgments across the ten scenarios, data for each study were analyzed with a 
linear mixed model fit with Satterthwaite approximation.  The model was specified to predict 
wrongness judgments from the fixed effects, our five appraisal indices, and the random 
effects (intercepts) of Participant and Scenario. The results of the analysis converged with the 
results of the regressions. In Study 2a, the injustice index had the largest individual 
contribution overall, B = .472 (SE = .031), t(1939) = 15.01, p < .001, 95% CI [.411, .533], 
followed closely by the purity index, B = .394 (SE = .024), t(1680) = 16.53, p < .001, 95% CI 
[.347, .441], then the harm index, B = .160 (SE = .026), t(1742) = 6.22, p < .001, 95% CI 
[.110, .210]. The contributions made by authority and disloyalty did not reach statistical 
significance, B = .036 (SE = .020), t(1822) = 1.75, p = .080, 95% CI [-.003,.075], B = .017 
(SE = .021), t(1962) = 0.83, p = .405, 95% CI [-.024, .058], respectively. The results for 
Study 2b were quite similar to Study 2a: the injustice index had the largest individual 
contribution overall, B = .449 (SE = .025), t(2457) = 17.98, p < .001, 95% CI [.400, .498], 
followed closely by the purity index, B = .319 (SE = .018), t(2094) = 18.06, p < .001, 95% CI 
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[.284, .354], then the harm index, B = .131 (SE = .019), t(2234) = 7.00, p < .001, 95% CI 
[.094, .168]. The contributions made by authority, B = -0.002 (SE = 0.014), t(2295) = -0.16, p 
= .873, 95% CI [-.029, .025], and disloyalty, B = -.019 (SE = .015), t(2441) = -1.29, p = .196, 
95% CI [-.048, .010], did not reach statistically significant levels.  
Study 3 
In Study 3, we sought to extend our findings to a different cultural context, Greece, 
which traditionally places great emphasis on familial bonds and parental discipline 
(Rosenthal, Bell, Demetriou, & Efklides, 1989), as an initial test of whether our claims about 
the extensive role of injustice, and moral pluralism, are culturally bounded.  
Method 
 Participants. Our aim was to recruit at least 200 participants living in Greece. We 
obtained permission from the ethics committee at Aristotle University of Thessaloniki to 
circulate a web link to the study within a psychology classroom and a Facebook page that 
many students from the university frequent.  This strategy led to a total 434 students who 
completed the entire survey (many others started but did not complete the survey). Among 
those that reached the end of the survey, twenty provided partial moral judgment responses at 
an unacceptable level (over three missing data points) or no demographic data. Thus, 414 
participants were retained (113 males, 301 females; Mage = 20.69 years, SD = 2.90). Ninety-
six percent of participants reported a Greek nationality, 99% White/Caucasian.  
 Materials and procedures. The materials and procedures were identical to Study 2a. 
To obtain a Greek version, the fourth author first translated the English materials to Greek. 
This Greek version was then back translated by a second person proficient in Greek and 
English (see https://osf.io/g7dpn/). 
Results and Discussion 
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 Wrongness and appraisal ratings. Direct statistical comparisons of the two 
culturally distinct samples were deemed inappropriate and therefore not carried out.  Relative 
to the U.S. sample from Study 2a, Greek participants had higher wrongness ratings for most 
of the transgressions, but this was less true compared to American sample 2b, which at times 
had the highest wrongness ratings (see Figure 1). Like the U.S. sample, there was a great deal 
of variation between scenarios (means ranged from 3.12 [L2] to 6.65 [H1]). Mean appraisal 
ratings can be found in Supplementary Figure S5. 
 Main analysis. We used the analysis strategy of Studies 2a–2b. Table 4 shows the 
results of these analyses, along with collinearity statistics (there were no instances of 
multicollinearity). Quite similar to Studies 2a–2b, the injustice index was a significant 
predictor for all ten scenarios ( range = .27–.48), highlighting its foundational role. By 
contrast, the harm index was a significant predictor of wrongdoing for only five of ten 
scenarios—the two harm scenarios, one fairness (race), loyalty (family), and authority 
(parents) ( range = .13-.25). We observed again evidence of moral pluralism. Disrespect-
for-authority appraisals were a significant predictor of wrongness for seven of ten scenarios, 
including both authority scenarios, and the impurity index significantly contributed to 
wrongness judgments for seven scenarios, including both purity scenarios. However, group-
disloyalty appraisals had a small negative contribution to two scenarios (dog kicking, flag 
burning).  
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Table 4. Appraisals predicting judgments of wrongdoing from Study 3 (Greek sample).  
 
 
Scenario 
 
Appraisals 
Model    
R2 
 
Tolerance 
 
VIF  t 95% CI 
Harm 1 – Dog 
kicking 
    .30   
 Injustice index .28 4.76*** [.157, .378]  .50 1.98 
 Harm index .21 4.21*** [.153, .421]  .75 1.34 
 Impurity index .11 2.12* [.005, .125]  .63 1.57 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .17 3.26** 
[.039, .159]  .67 1.50 
 Disloyal to group -.10 -2.00* [-.090, -.001]  .71 1.41 
Harm 2 – Overweight      .42   
 Injustice index .33 6.01*** [.255, .503]  .50 1.98 
 Harm index .25 5.27*** [.221, .485]  .64 1.55 
 Impurity index .10 1.80 [-.007, .166]  .52 1.94 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .16 3.50** 
[.055, .194]  .71 1.40 
 Disloyal to group -.05 -0.95 [-.112, .039]  .61 1.64 
Fairness 1 – Race      .47   
 Injustice index .40 6.69*** [.441, .808]  .39 2.59 
 Harm index .13 2.57* [.045, .339]  .53 1.89 
 Impurity index .15 2.95** [.055, .275]  .52 1.91 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .13 2.48* 
[.030, .261]  .53 1.90 
 Disloyal to group -.00 -0.10 [-.092, .083]  .69 1.45 
Fairness 2 – Friend      .41   
 Injustice index .44 8.04*** [.483, .795]  .50 2.00 
 Harm index .09 1.78 [-.012, .257]  .58 1.72 
 Impurity index .13 2.54* [.035, .274]  .59 1.69 
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 Disrespectful to 
authority .09 1.89 
[-.004, .178]  .67 1.49 
 Disloyal to group .00 0.05 [-.096, .101]  .67 1.49 
Loyalty 1 – Family     .39   
 Injustice index .39 6.18*** [.458, .885]  .40 2.50 
 Harm index .18 3.78*** [.148, .470]  .68 1.47 
 Impurity index .08 1.57 [-.034, .304]  .55 1.82 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .08 1.43 
[-.034, .214]  .52 1.91 
 Disloyal to group .01 0.14 [-.113, .130]  .61 1.64 
Loyalty 2 – Flag 
burning 
    .54   
 Injustice index .48 8.07*** [.483, .794]  .33 3.04 
 Harm index .07 1.62 [-.020, .213]  .58 1.73 
 Impurity index .21 3.70*** [.131, .429]  .36 2.81 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .13 2.87** 
[.051, .270]  .54 1.85 
 Disloyal to group -.09 -2.09* [-.208, -.007]  .57 1.75 
Authority 1 – Parents      .40   
 Injustice index .34 5.81*** [.304, .616]  .45 2.20 
 Harm index .15 3.12** [.093, .406]  .65 1.53 
 Impurity index .14 2.62** [.039, .270]  .53 1.88 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .19 3.80*** 
[.108, .340]  .64 1.55 
 Disloyal to group -.07 -1.36 [-.160, .029]  .66 1.52 
Authority 2 – Boss      .40   
 Injustice index .45 7.78*** [.450, .755]  .46 2.17 
 Harm index .03 0.71 [-.071, .151]  .68 1.48 
 Impurity index .04 0.82 [-.075, .182]  .62 1.61 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .26 5.36*** 
[.213, .460]  .68 1.47 
 Disloyal to group -.07 -1.41 [-.165, .027]  .65 1.53 
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Purity 1 – Dog eating      .48   
 Injustice index .33 5.78*** [.268, .544]  .41 2.41 
 Harm index -.03 -0.61 [-.122, .064]  .80 1.23 
 Impurity index .41 8.69*** [.428, .678]  .58 1.71 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .06 1.27 
[-.042, .193]  .50 2.01 
 Disloyal to group -.01 -0.17 [-.098, .082]  .62 1.62 
Purity 2 – 
Consensual incest  
    .55   
 Injustice index .27 4.67*** [.211, .519]  .35 2.86 
 Harm index .07 1.54 [-.021, .179]  .56 1.79 
 Impurity index .42 8.85*** [.412, .648]  .51 1.96 
 Disrespectful to 
authority .15 3.22** 
[.072, .297]  .52 1.94 
 Disloyal to group -.06 -1.33 [-.160, .031]  .57 1.76 
Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. Betas in bold are significant at p < .05. R2 given for full model. Ns = 400–408.
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 Mixed linear model. Similar to Studies 2a–2b, injustice made the greatest 
contribution to wrongness judgments across domains, B = .538 (SE = .024), t(4022) = 22.08, 
p < .001, 95% CI [.491, .585], followed by impurity, B = .288 (SE = .019), t(3568) = 15.10, p 
< .001, 95% CI [.251, .325]. Yet differently, authority appraisals made a substantive 
independent contribution, B = .147 (SE = .017), t(4051) = 8.75, p < .001, 95% CI [.114, 
.180], which was even greater than the contribution made by the harm index, B = .103 (SE = 
.018), t(3140) = 5.59, p < .001, 95% CI [.068, .138]. Like Studies 2a–2b, group disloyalty did 
not substantially contribute to wrongness judgments across content, B = -.022 (SE = .014), 
t(4044) = -1.55, p =.122, 95% CI [-.049, .005].   
 Thus, once again we observed evidence for a pluralistic account of moral judgment. 
While appraisals of injustice served as a ubiquitous foundation for wrongdoing in the Greek 
sample, there was substantial evidence as well for individual contributions made by other 
dimensions, including appraisals of harm, impurity, and disrespect for authority.  
General Discussion 
Across four studies incorporating two different methodologies and two different 
nationalities (American, Greek), we found that injustice appraisals provided a conceptual 
foundation for judgments of moral wrongdoing that was unmatched by harm appraisals. 
Furthermore, we found evidence for moral pluralism. Study 1 focused on offenses grounded 
in participants’ real experiences, which produced a diverse range of content, with stealing, 
deception, killing, and rudeness as the most common transgressions (see Figure S1).  Despite 
this moral diversity, injustice and harm were the only dimensions that independently 
predicted ratings of wrongness. Studies 2a–2b and 3 adopted an experimenter-driven 
methodology to ensure a wider coverage of content, and sampled from the U.S. (Studies 2a–
2b) and Greece (Study 3). For both cultural samples, we found that injustice appraisals 
contributed significant, independent variance to all, or all but one, of the transgressions, 
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highlighting its extensive, foundational role. Appraisals of harm contributed substantially to 
several transgressions, for both samples, but this contribution was much narrower than that of 
injustice appraisals. Critically for debates regarding moral pluralism, we found that several 
other appraisals—those related to appraisals of impurity (all three studies) and disrespect 
towards authority (for the Greek sample)—contributed to judgments of wrongdoing across 
diverse content.  
When taken together, our findings provide substantial support for the role of injustice 
as a comprehensive foundation for moral judgment, certainly stronger and more far-reaching 
than appraisals of harm. Furthermore, our findings support a pluralistic view of moral 
judgment. Not only did appraisals distinct from harm and injustice predict moral judgments 
in sensible ways, at least one appraisal dimension (impurity) made a more extensive, 
independent contribution to moral judgments than monistic theories would predict (e.g., Gray 
& Keeney, 2015). The present findings advance an understanding of which appraisals are 
central to moral judgments of wrongdoing and which contribute more narrowly. While past 
research on the deflationary theory of harm has indicated that appraisals of injustice are 
essential to viewing a harmful action as transgressive (Piazza & Sousa, 2016; Piazza et al., 
2013; Sousa et al., 2009), no research to date has shown injustice appraisals to be important 
to all sorts of wrongdoing, beyond those involving harm. Our methodological approach also 
advances work on the topic of moral pluralism, not because we find strong evidence of 
different “domains” of moral evaluation, but instead because we demonstrate that several 
distinctive appraisals are implicated in a range of moral judgments. 
One important limitation is that the methodologies employed here were not ideal for 
conducting principal component analyses because all ten appraisals were negatively 
valenced. While two-factor structures were found across the three studies, the two 
components were difficult to interpret due to multiple cross-loadings (see Supplementary 
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Materials for details). Future studies should put effort into developing alternative 
methodologies that are better suited for testing the conceptual boundaries between morally-
relevant appraisals – for example, factor-analytic strategies that use semantic similarity-
dissimilarity ratings (e.g., rate the similarity of these statements: “causing someone pain”, 
“being disloyal to a group”, etc.). Second, we measured rather than manipulated appraisals, 
limiting the causal conclusions we can draw. Finally, we measured moral wrongdoing 
without probing additional criteria, such as authority independence or generalizability, that 
could more clearly differentiate normative evaluations related to moral versus conventional 
transgressions (see Turiel, 1983).  
Why did we find evidence for moral pluralism when some recent findings have found 
otherwise? The answer may have to do with divergent operationalizations of harm. Many 
studies that have challenged the moral relevance of appraisals such as unfairness, impurity, 
and disloyalty by pitting these dimensions against harm (see e.g., Gray et al., 2014; Schein & 
Gray, 2015) have unduly operationalized harm with words like “harmful” and “cruel” – 
which express not only harm qua pain/suffering but also the unjust causation of 
pain/suffering, thereby favouring terminologically the relationship between harm and 
immorality. Thus, we operationalized harm by using expressions related to pain and 
wellbeing that more unambiguously expressed the intended concept. Yet this still leaves open 
the empirical possibility that many transgressions are considered immoral partly because they 
are perceived as involving the (intentional) causation of suffering or welfare reduction. 
Indeed, in our studies, appraisals of pain/welfare reduction did contribute to wrongness 
judgments across a range of immoral content. Nevertheless, our findings do not support the 
monistic argument that harm appraisals is the foundation of all immorality, as in many cases 
other appraisal dimensions surpassed the contribution made by harm appraisals and/or harm 
appraisals did not contribute much at all.   
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Conclusion 
Four studies showcased the foundational role of injustice for morality, beyond the role 
played by harm, and simultaneously revealed support for moral pluralism. Not all harmful 
actions are considered transgressive, and our findings indicate that harm is not the foundation 
of all moral wrongdoing.  
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